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Abstract
This paper studies the dominance-solvability (by iterated deletion of weakly
dominated strategies) of plurality rule voting games. For K ¸ 3 alternatives
and n ¸ 3 voters, we …nd su¢cient conditions for the game to be dominance-
solvable (DS) and not to be DS. These conditions can be stated in terms of only
one statistic of the game, the largest proportion of voters who agree on which
alternative is worst in a sequence of subsets of the original set of alternatives.
When n is large, “almost all” games can be classi…ed as either DS or not DS. If
the game is DS, a Condorcet Winner always exists when n ¸ 4, and the outcome
is always the Condorcet Winner when the electorate is su¢ciently replicated.
2
1. Introduction
Plurality voting is the dominant electoral rule in most democracies. Nevertheless,
its properties are still not well-understood. One literature has studied plurality
rule under the simplifying assumption that voters vote sincerely i.e. for their most
preferred alternative (Lepelley (1993), Gehrlein (1998), Gehrlein and Lepelley
(1998)). Even with this simpli…cation, plurality rule is far from the most well-
behaved voting rule. For example, in contrast to the case with majority rule
between pairs of alternatives, it is possible that even when a Condorcet winner1
(CW) exists, it is not selected by plurality rule. By imposing a stochastic structure
on the voting problem (every voter has a preference ordering drawn at random
from the possible orderings over a …nite set of alternatives, and all orderings
are equally likely), the literature on sincere voting can make statements about
which kind of voting rule is most likely to choose the CW, and avoid choosing the
Condorcet loser. Plurality rule performs rather badly in this setting; for example,
Gehrlein(1998) shows that with plurality voting, selection of a CW is less likely,
and selection of a Condorcet loser is more likely, than with approval voting.
Of course, the assumption that voters vote sincerely is very strong, and has no
game theoretic foundations. In many circumstances2, if other voters are voting
sincerely, it is rational for a voter not to vote for their most preferred candidate
(i.e. sincere voting is not a Nash equilibrium). In practice, strategic (non-sincere)
voting seems to be quite common where plurality rule voting is used. For ex-
ample, in parliamentary elections in the UK and Germany evidence suggests that
candidates who were perceived to be running third were deserted by their support-
1An alternative that beats (is beaten by) every other in pair-wise voting with majority rule
is called the Condorcet Winner (Loser).
2A simple case is where voter 1 prefers x to y to z, voter 2 prefers y to x to z, and voter
3 prefers z to y to x: Assume (as we do below) that ties are broken by selecting each winning
alternative with equal probability. Suppose now that voters 1 and 2 vote sincerely. If 3 votes
sincerely, each of the three alternatives occurs with probability 1/3. If 3 votes for his second-
ranked alternative y; the outcome is y with probability 1. If voter 3 prefers the second outcome,
he will vote strategically.
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ers (Cox(1997), Chapter 4). Moreover there is some experimental evidence that
voters do vote strategically in three candidate elections (Forsythe et al. (1996)).
The main problem that arises when we move away from sincere voting is
that multiple voting equilibria are pervasive with plurality rule. For example3,
consider the “canonical” plurality voting game where voters vote simultaneously,
preferences are common knowledge, and ties are broken according to a “neutral”
rule that treats alternatives symmetrically4. It is obvious that with at least three
voters, any candidate may win in a Nash equilibrium: if all other voters vote for
this candidate, then it is a (weak) best response for any voter to also vote for that
candidate5, as she cannot a¤ect the outcome, however she votes.
The reason this problem arises is that Nash equilibrium allows any possible
beliefs on the part of voters, as long as they are consistent. For example, suppose
that it is common knowledge that a candidate, z is worst for all voters. Neverthe-
less, there is a Nash equilibrium where every voter votes for z because he believes
that all other voters will vote for z. The obvious response to this problem is to look
for equilibrium re…nements, such as ruling out weakly dominated voting strategies
(Besley and Coate(1997)). However, it turns out that standard re…nements have
little bite in this canonical plurality rule game. De Sinopoli(1999) shows that with
more than four voters, if an alternative is not a strict Condorcet loser, there is a
3The multiple equilibrium problem also arises when agents have incomplete information
about some aspect of the structure of the game (Myatt(1999), Myerson and Weber(1993), My-
erson(1998)). For example, Myerson(1998) studies “scoring” voting rules (of which plurality
voting is a special case) in an environment where there are three alternatives, each voter is
equally likely to have three possible preference orderings over these alternatives (in the base
case), and the number of voters is a Poisson random variable. The equilibrium is de…ned for
the limiting case as the expected number of voters becomes large, and allows voters to make
small mistakes. Even in this setting, plurality rule generates multiple equilibria; there is an
equilibrium where any one of the three candidates can win with probability one.
4The only such rule is: if there are K alternatives with the most number of votes, then each
of these alternatives is selected as winner with probability 1=K (Myerson(1998)):
5This is in contrast to pairwise majority voting over a prede…ned binary agenda. If agents
play weakly undominated actions at each stage, there is always a unique outcome. However,
when a CW does not exist, the outcome is agenda-dependent.
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perfect Nash equilibrium where that alternative is an outcome with probability at
least 0.5. Moreover, there is by de…nition only one strict Condorcet loser in any
set of alternatives. It follows from this result that imposing the weaker re…nement
of weakly undominated Nash equilibrium will rule out at most one alternative as
a Nash outcome.
We take a di¤erent approach to this problem of multiplicity of Nash equilibria
in this paper. First, we argue below that eliminating weakly dominated strategies
is very reasonable in the plurality rule game; it simply amounts to no-one voting
for her worst-ranked alternative6. But, there is nothing to stop voters going a step
further and recalculating which strategies are weakly dominated for them given
that other voters will not use weakly dominated strategies. In other words, if
we iteratively eliminate weakly dominated strategies, it is possible that we could
substantially narrow down the set of possible outcomes in the plurality voting
game. It has long been recognized that iterated deletion may be a powerful tool
for predicting outcomes in voting games. For example, Farquarson (1969) called
this procedure “sophisticated voting”, and he called a voting game “determinate”
if sophisticated voting led to a unique outcome.
Our paper addresses the question of when the plurality rule voting game is
determinate, or dominance solvable. The main contribution is to derive conditions
that are su¢cient for the game to be dominance-solvable and not to be dominance-
solvable. Moreover, as the number of voters, n; becomes large, these conditions are
asymptotically necessary and su¢cient for dominance-solvability. The conditions
are most easily stated in the case of three alternatives, when they involve just one
summary statistic of the game, namely the largest fraction of players that agree
on which alternative is worst, q. When this fraction is greater than 2/3, the game
is always dominance-solvable; when this fraction is less than or equal to 2=3¡¼n,
for some ¼n > 0, the game is never dominance-solvable. Moreover, there is at
most only one possible value of q between 2=3 and 2=3¡¼n, and ¼n goes to zero
asymptotically.
6Lemma 1 below shows that with more than three voters, the only voting strategy that is
weakly dominated is the one where the voter votes for her worst alternative.
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The intuition for the su¢ciency condition is straightforward. First, voting for
one’s worst alternative is weakly dominated, so if a su¢cient fraction of the voters
agree on which is worst, all voters can deduce that this alternative cannot win
if voters do not vote for weakly dominated alternatives. But if this alternative
cannot win, a vote for it is “wasted” i.e. weakly dominated wherever it appears in a
voter’s preference ordering, so the game is reduced to one of just two alternatives
by iterated deletion, and two-alternative voting games are always dominance-
solvable.
The intuition behind the su¢cient condition for the game not to be dominance-
solvable is more subtle. When there is su¢cient disagreement on the worst alter-
native, the space of weakly undominated strategy pro…les is rich enough to ensure
that for any voter i, voting for her middle-ranked (or best) alternative is a unique
best response (i.e. not weakly dominated) to some weakly undominated pro…le of
voting strategies of the other players. This means that iterated deletion cannot
proceed beyond deleting the strategy of voting for one’s worst alternative.
In the completely general case with n voters andK alternatives, the conditions
generalize from the three-alternative case. In a game with K alternatives, let
qK be the largest fraction of players who agree on which alternative (say zK) is
worst. When zK is deleted from the feasible set; let qK¡1 be the largest fraction
of players who agree on which remaining alternative (say zK¡1) is worst, and so
on. This procedure generates a sequence qK ; qK¡1;..q3: Our su¢cient condition
for dominance-solvability is that each element in the sequence be su¢ciently large
(qk > (k ¡ 1)=k) i.e. there should be su¢cient agreement on which alternative is
worst across the players. Our su¢cient condition for non-dominance-solvability is
that there is an 3 · l · K, such that for all k > l, qk is su¢ciently large, but ql
fails to be su¢ciently large (i.e. ql · (l ¡ 1)=l ¡ ¼ln, for some ¼ln > 0). Moreover,
as n! 1; ¼kn ! 0:We are able to show that if we increase the number of voters
without changing the distribution of preferences across alternatives (replicating
the electorate), for a large enough electorate, we have necessary and su¢cient
conditions7 for the game to be dominance-solvable. Finally, when the su¢cient
7Subject to a weak regularity condition - see Theorem 4 below.
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conditions for dominance-solvability hold, we show that the only strategies that
survive iterated deletion involve every voter voting for one of two alternatives
(a strong form of Duverger’s Law, Cox (1997)), and moreover, every voter votes
“sincerely” over this pair i.e. for her more-preferred alternative of the two.
A key question is the nature of the winning alternative(s) when the game
is dominance-solvable. Here, the benchmark is majority voting with a binary
agenda. Here, it is well-known that the subgame-perfect equilibrium outcome8 is
agenda-independent if and only if a CW exists, and in this case, the unique out-
come is the CW. We show that the relationship between dominance-solvability and
CWs is much less sharp. When the number of voters is at least four, dominance-
solvability implies that a CW exists, but the reverse implication does not hold.
Moreover, even if the game is dominance-solvable, and a CW exists, the out-
come may not be the CW! On the other hand, when the electorate is su¢ciently
replicated, then the outcome is always some CW whenever the game is dominance-
solvable.
Related literature is as follows. The only work of which we are aware on re…ne-
ments of Nash equilibrium with plurality voting is De Sinopoli(1998), as described
above. De Sinopoli and Turrini(1999) showed that iterated deletion of weakly
dominated strategies may be applied to eliminate some of the Nash equilibria in
the citizen-candidate model of Besley and Coate (1997). They show that in a four
alternative, seven-person example, that iterated weak dominance eliminates all
the Nash equilibria except for one. To our knowledge there are no general results
on conditions for dominance solvability of strategic-form games. However, Borg-
ers(1992), Borgers and Janssen(1992) have results on the dominance-solvability
of Bertrand and Cournot games. For example, Borgers(1992) shows that in a
model of Bertrand price competition, under some conditions, the set of prices
that survive iterated deletion is close to the Walrasian price, and Borgers and
Janssen(1992) have similar results for the Cournot case9. More recently, Mar-
8This outcome is always unique under the assumption that voters do not play weakly un-
dominated strategies, and that (in the case of an even number of voters), a tie-breaking rule is
speci…ed.
9They show that the Cournot outputs are the only outputs that survive iterated deletion if
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iotti (1999) has provided a class of games (called maximum games) which are
dominance solvable.
The layout of the paper is as follows. The model is outlined in Section 2.
Examples and preliminary results are presented in Section 3. Our analysis of the
three alternative case is in Section 4, and the more general case in Section 5.
Section 6 discusses some extensions and concludes.
2. The Model
There is a set N = f1; ::ng of voters with n ¸ 3 and a set X = fx1; ::xKg of
alternatives. Voter i 2 N has utility function ui : X ! <: The voting game
is as follows. Each voter has one vote, which she can cast for any one of the
K alternatives (i.e. no abstentions are allowed). The alternative with the largest
number of votes wins (plurality rule). If two or more alternatives have the greatest
number of votes, every alternative in this set is selected with equal probability.
All voters vote simultaneously.
This game can be written more formally in strategic form as follows. Let
Vi = X be the strategy set of i; with generic element vi. If vi = xk, voter i votes
for alternative xk. Let v be the strategy pro…le v = (v1; ::vn). Let !k(v) be the
number of votes for alternative xk if the strategy pro…le is v. Also, let the winset
W (v) ½ X be de…ned as
W (v) = fxk 2 X j!k(v) ¸ !l(v); xl 2 X g
This is the set of alternatives that receive the most number of votes. Let L(Y );
Y ½ X denote the lottery over Y where each alternative in Y is chosen with equal
probability. Then, given a strategy pro…le v, depending on the context, we refer
to either W (v) or L(W (v)) as the outcome of the game10:
and only if the underlying Walrasian market is globally stable under cobweb dynamics.
10Also, if W = fxg, we write L(W ) = fxg:
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So, we can write down the payo¤ to i as a function of the strategy pro…le v as
ui(v) =
1
#W (v)
X
xk2W (v)
ui(xk)
This completes the description of the plurality rule game in strategic form. We
denote the game formally by ¡ = (ui; Vi)i2N where of course Vi = X; so sometimes
we write ¡ = (ui;X)i2N .
We will impose the following regularity condition which ensures that the order
of deletion of weakly dominated strategies does not matter.
A1: For all v; v0 s.t. W (v) 6= W (v0); ui(v) 6= ui(v0); i 2 N
This says that no player is indi¤erent between any two di¤erent winsets11. It is
satis…ed generically in the space of utility functions on X:
Finally, the following notation will be useful. Let !¡i(v¡i) be a vector recording
the total votes for each alternative in X given a strategy pro…le v¡i i.e. when
individual i is not included. Also, let -¡i = f!¡i(v¡i) jv¡i 2 V¡ig. We suppress
the dependence of !¡i on v¡i except when needed and refer to !¡i as a vote
distribution. Clearly i’s best response to !¡i depends only on the information in
!¡i.
Two comments are in order at this point. First, we do not allow mixed strate-
gies; as discussed in the Conclusions below, this is not a major restriction. Second,
we do not allow voters to abstain; this is without loss of generality because ab-
stention is always a weakly dominated strategy for any voter (Brams(1994)), and
so will be deleted at the …rst round of the iterated deletion process.
A Nash equilibrium in the game is de…ned in the usual way as a strategy
pro…le v¤ where v¤i is a best response to v¤¡i, i 2 N . Say that W ¤ = W (v¤)
or L¤ = L(W ¤) is the Nash equilibrium outcome. Let xmaxi be i’s (unique) most
preferred alternative in X; and say that i votes sincerely if vi = xmaxi . A Nash
equilibrium is sincere if all voters vote sincerely in that equilibrium. Note that
any alternative in xk 2 X is a Nash equilibrium outcome, for it is supported by
11A1 implies that no voter is indi¤erent between any pair of alternatives.
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the Nash equilibrium strategies that vi = xk, all i. This observation motivates
our analysis in this paper.
Finally, de…ne an alternative x 2 X to be a Condorcet winner if #fi 2
N jx Âi yg ¸ #fi 2 N jy Âi xg, all y 6= x; and say that x is a strict Con-
dorcet loser if all the inequalities hold strictly, and weak otherwise. As we have
assumed strict preferences, if the number of voters, n; is odd, the CW is strict i.e.
unique, but if n is even, this is not necessarily the case (Moulin(1983), p 29). In
the former case, denote the unique CW by xcw, and in the latter case, denote the
set of CWs by Xcw:
3. Characterizing Undominated Nash Equilibrium
In this section, we show that requiring strategies simply to be undominated in our
voting game does not signi…cantly narrow down the set of predicted outcomes.
First, we establish the following useful Lemma which almost fully12 characterizes
weakly dominated strategies in the voting game. With three alternatives, say
that i 2 N has dominated middle alternative (DMA) preferences if he prefers a
lottery (with equal probabilities) over all three alternatives (i.e. L(X)) to his
middle-ranked (i.e., second-ranked) alternative13.
Lemma 1. In the plurality rule game, the strategy of voting for one’s worst
alternative is always weakly dominated, and the strategy of voting for one’s best
alternative is never weakly dominated (Brams (1994)). Moreover, if n = K = 3,
voting for one’s middle-ranked alternative is weakly dominated i¤ that player has
DMA preferences. If n > 3, voting for one’s worst alternative is the only weakly
dominated strategy.
This result, along with all others, is proved in the Appendix14. This result
12Except for the case n = 3;K > 3:
13Note that we do not need to distinguish between strict and weak DMA preferences because
from (A1), if a voter prefers L(X) to his middle-ranked alternative, he always does so strictly.
14De Sinopoli, 1999, proves the su¢ciency of DMA preferences for the middle-ranked alter-
native of a voter to be weakly dominated.
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illustrates an important di¤erence between three-player games and those with
more than three players. In the latter case, the set of preference pro…les is rich
enough so that when i votes for any alternative in X except his worst-ranked,
we can …nd a v¡i 2 V¡i such that this strategy for i is a unique best response
to v¡i. By contrast, in the case of three voters and three alternatives, whether a
voter’s middle-ranked alternative is weakly dominated or not depends on cardinal
preferences.
De…ne an alternative x 2 X to be a Condorcet loser if #fi 2 N jx Âi yg ·
#fi 2 N jy Âi xg, all y 6= x; and say that x is a strict Condorcet loser if all the
inequalities hold strictly, and weak otherwise. There can be at most one strict
Condorcet loser, but if n is even, there can be multiple weak Condorcet losers.
We then have the following result, which mostly follows from De Sinopoli (1999):
Proposition 1. Assume n > 3: If x 2 X is not a strict Condorcet loser, then
there is an undominated Nash equilibrium where x occurs with probability of at
least 0.5. Furthermore, if x is not a weak Condorcet loser either, then there is
an undominated Nash equilibrium where x occurs with probability 1. Assume
n = K = 3: If x 2 X is not a strict Condorcet loser, and no voter has DMA
preferences, then there is an undominated Nash equilibrium where x occurs with
probability 1.
The above result suggests that when a Condorcet loser does not exist, then all
alternatives must be possible unique outcomes of undominated Nash equilibria,
and this is indeed the case, as the following example shows.
Example 1. The ordinal preferences of voters 1,...6 over alternatives x; y; z are
given below:
1; 2 : x Â y Â z
3; 4 : y Â z Â x
5; 6 : z Â x Â y
Note that there is neither a Condorcet winner nor a Condorcet loser in this exam-
ple. By Lemma 1, in an undominated Nash equilibrium, a voter can vote for either
11
his top-ranked or middle-ranked alternative. So, consider the following strategy
pro…les
v¤1; v¤2; v¤5; v¤6 = x; v¤3; v¤4 = y
v¤¤1 ; v
¤¤
2 ; v
¤¤
3 ; v
¤¤
4 = y; v
¤¤
5 ; v
¤¤
6 = z
v¤¤¤3 ; v
¤¤¤
4 ; v
¤¤¤
5 ; v
¤¤¤
6 = z; v
¤¤¤
1 ; v
¤¤¤
2 = x
It is clear that v¤ is an undominated Nash equilibrium where x is the unique out-
come, v¤¤ is an undominated Nash equilibrium where y is the unique outcome, and
…nally, v¤¤¤ is an undominated Nash equilibrium where z is the unique outcome.
¤
4. Results for Three Alternatives
The case of three alternatives is of course special, but in this case, our results can
presented in a simple and intuitive way, which helps prepare for discussion of the
general many-alternative case in the next Section. The general results can also
be strengthened somewhat in this case. Moreover, comparative studies of voting
systems tend to work with the three-alternative case as it is simplest case that
serves to di¤erentiate alternative systems (e.g. majority voting, plurality voting,
approval voting); see for example, Myerson and Weber(1993), Myerson(1999), and
it is also the simplest case where strategic voting may occur. In practice, some
important political contests typically have three candidates or less e.g. presidential
elections in the US (Levin and Nalebu¤, 1995). We begin by de…ning iterated
deletion of weakly dominated strategies: all de…nitions here also apply to the
general case.
4.1. Iterated Deletion of Weakly Dominated Strategies
As argued below, due to assumption A1, in our model, the outcome of iterated
deletion of weakly dominated strategies does not depend on the order in which
strategies are deleted. However, for expositional convenience, for the most part,
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we will assume an order of deletion as in Moulin(1983). Let NWDi(Si; S¡i) µ Vi
be the set of strategies for i which are not weakly dominated15 by any v0i 2 Si;
given S¡i µ V¡i. Let V 0i = Vi, and de…ne recursively
V mi = NWDi(V
m¡1
i ; V
m¡1
¡i ); i 2 N; m = 1; 2::: (4.1)
Also, say that a vi is weakly dominated relative to V m¡1 if it is not in V mi . As
X is …nite, this algorithm converges after a …nite number of steps to V 1 =
V 11 £ V 12 :: £ V 1n : the set of weakly iteratively undominated strategy pro…les.
The set of iteratively weakly undominated outcomes is U = fW (v) jv 2 V1g:
The game is said to be dominance-solvable (DS) if either V1 only contains
one strategy pro…le v1, or V1 contains several strategy pro…les; which are payo¤
-equivalent for all players. If the game is dominance-solvable16, by A1, every
v1 2 V 1 generates the same outcome which we denote by W1 (so U = fW1g).
For if not, by A1, all players would not be indi¤erent between two pro…les in V 1,
contradicting the assumed payo¤-equivalence of elements of V1. So, we refer to
W1, or equivalently L1 = L(W1) as the solution outcome.
Note that, following Moulin(1983), at each “round” of deletion we delete the
weakly dominated strategies of all players, and then proceed to the next round.
However, by assumption A1, this is without loss of generality in the following
sense. Let V^ 1 be the set of iteratively undominated strategies following some
di¤erent procedure17 for deletion. Then, the game is dominance-solvable by our
procedure i¤ it is dominance-solvable by the other procedure18. Moreover, if the
15Formally,
Di = fvi 2 Si j /9v0i 2 Sijui(v0i; v¡i) ¸ ui(vi; v¡i)8v¡i 2 S¡i; ui(v0i; v¡i) > ui(vi; v¡i) some v¡i 2 S¡i g
16If a Nash equilibrium v¤ is in V 1, we say that it is iteratively (weakly) undominated. If
a game is dominance-solvable it is well-known that any v1 2 V 1 is a Nash equilibrium, so
dominance-solvability implies that there exists a unique iteratively undominated Nash equilib-
rium outcome.
17For example, “player-by-player” deletion, where (say) player 1’s weakly dominated strategies
are deleted from his strategy set, then the weakly dominated strategies of player 2 are calculated,
then player 2’s weakly dominated strategies are deleted from his strategy set, and so on.
18This follows from the results of Marx and Swinkels(1997). First, by our assumption A1,
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game is dominance solvable, the outcome is the same under either procedure i.e.
W (v1) =W (v^1); all v1 2 V1; v^1 2 V^1:
4.2. Su¢cient Conditions for Dominance-Solvability and Non-Dominance
Solvability
Let the set of alternatives X = fx; y; zg. Let Nx; Ny;Nz be the sets of voters that
rank x; y or z respectively as worst, and let nx; ny; nz be the numbers of voters in
each set. Also, de…ne q = maxa2X na=n; this is the largest fraction of voters who
agree on which alternative is worst, and let b = argmaxa2X na be the alternative
that most rank worst. So, b is easily remembered as denoting a “bottom-ranked”
alternative.
Now de…ne a critical value of q as:
qn =
(
1 ¡ 1n ¡ 1n
£
n+1
3
¤
; n odd
1 ¡ 1n
£n+2
3
¤
; n even
(4.2)
where [x] denotes the smallest integer larger than x: Note that qn < 2=3, and
limn!1 qn = 2=3: Finally, say that in game ¡ = (ui; X)i2N , preferences are po-
larized over alternative x 2 X if there is an M ½ N such that all i 2 M rank
x highest, and i 2 N=M rank x lowest19. Preferences over alternative x are
non-polarized otherwise.
We then have the following result, most of which follows directly from Theo-
rems 1 and 2 below, setting K = 3;
their TDI condition is satis…ed in the game ¡ = (ui;X)i2N : So, by their Corollary 1, V 1; V^ 1
only di¤er by the addition or removal of redundant strategies and a renaming of strategies.
But a redundant strategy is payo¤-equivalent for all players to some other strategy (Marx and
Swinkels(1997), De…nition 5), and so by A1, must give the same outcome as some other strategy.
However, condition A1 guarantees that no player is indi¤erent between any two outcomes, and
therefore under this regularity condition, the two notions of iterated dominance are equivalent.
19This is a general de…nition, and does not only apply to the case of K = 3. We will assume
that b is unique i.e. that q > 1=2: This is without loss of generality, as we use the de…nition of
b only in the case where q ¸ 2=3:
14
Proposition 2. Assume that K = 3. If (i) q > 2=3, or (ii) q = 2=3, and
preferences are not polarized over b, the game is dominance-solvable. If q ·
qn; then the game is not dominance-solvable.
The intuition for this result is as described in the introduction. Note that
Proposition 2 can classify the game as dominance-solvable or not in almost all
cases, the exceptions being (i) when q = 2=3 and preferences over b are polarized,
(ii) q = qn + 1=n < 2=3; (iii) qn + 1=n < q < 2=3: Finally, it is possible to show
that (iii) never occurs, so we have;
Corollary 1. The only possible circumstances20 in which the plurality voting
game cannot be classi…ed as dominance-solvable or not are (i) when q = 2=3 and
preferences over b are polarized, (ii) q = qn + 1=n < 2=3:
The following examples illustrate what may happen in these two exceptional
cases. The …rst example shows that the non-polarization condition is needed for
dominance-solvability when q = 2=3:
Example 2. The ordinal preferences of the six voters are as follows.
1; 2; 3; 4 : x Â y Â z
5; 6 : z Â x Â y
Also, voters 1-4 have non-DMA preferences. Note that q = 4=6 = 2=3; and
preferences over z are polarized, so this game is not classi…ed by Proposition 2.
In fact, the game is not dominance-solvable. To show this, we prove that for any
voter, it is a weakly undominated strategy relative to V 1 to vote for her second-
ranked alternative. A similar argument (left to the reader) then shows that it is a
weakly undominated strategy relative to V 1 to vote for her …rst-ranked alternative.
These two statements together then imply that iterated deletion stops at the …rst
round.
By Lemma 1, V 1i = fx; yg; i = 1; ::4; V 1i = fx; zg; i = 5; 6: De…ne -1¡i =
f!¡i(v¡i)
¯¯
v¡i 2 V 1¡ig. We show that for every voter i, there exists ~!¡i 2 -1¡i such
20Note that q = qn + 1=n < 2=3 may not occur e.g. q4 = q6 = 0:5, but q4 + 1=4 = 3=4 >
2=3; q6 + 1=6 = 2=3:
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that her second-ranked alternative is a unique best response to ~!¡i. Speci…cally,
for i = 1; ::4; y is a unique best response to ~!¡i = (1; 2; 2); as 1; ::4 have DMA
preferences. Also, for i = 5; 6; x is a best response to ~!¡i = (2; 3; 0): Finally, it is
easily checked that ~!¡i 2 -1¡i, all i = 1; ::6: ¤
The next example shows that whether or not the game is DS when q = qn+ 1n <
2=3 depends on whether preferences over b are polarized.
Example 3. The ordinal preferences of the …ve voters are as follows.
1; 2; 3 : x Â y Â z
4 : x Â z Â y
5 : z Â x Â y
Note that qn = 2=5; q = 3=5; so, q = qn + 1n < 2=3. Also, preferences are not
polarized over b so the game is not classi…ed by Proposition 2. We will show that
the game is dominance-solvable.
First, note that after the …rst round of deletion, by Lemma 1, V 1i = fx; yg; i =
1; ::3; V 1i = fx; zg; i = 4; 5:We show that for voter 4, v4 = z is weakly dominated
by v4 = x. Suppose to the contrary that there exists a !¡4 2 -1¡4 such that z
is a unique best response to !¡4. This requires that 4 must be able to a¤ect the
outcome by voting z; given some !¡4 2 -1¡4: The only such vote distributions
are !¡4 = (2; 1; 1); (1; 2; 1). But it is clear that voter 4 does better voting for
x in response to each of these, a contradiction. [For example, if he votes for x
rather than z against (2; 1; 1); the outcome is x rather than L(x; z), which voter
4 obviously prefers.] So, at the end of the second round of deletion, z can get
at most one vote and so cannot win, in which case v5 = z is weakly dominated
for voter 5. The game is then reduced to one where each player can vote for (at
most) one of two alternatives x; y and is thus dominance-solvable.
Now suppose that voter 4’s preferences change so that z Â x Â y: Then, pref-
erences are polarized over z:We can now show that with this change in preferences
the game is not dominance-solvable. Following the argument in Example 2, we
show that every voter i’s second ranked alternative is a best response to some
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~!¡i 2 -1¡i: First z is now a unique best response for 4 to ~!¡4 = (2; 1; 1): Also, x
is a unique best response by 5 to ~!¡5 = (2; 2; 0); and y is a unique best response
by 1,2,3 to ~!¡i = (0; 2; 2): Also, ~!¡i 2 -1¡i; i = 1; ::6. A similar argument shows
that no top-ranked alternative is weakly dominated either. So, iterated deletion
stops after the …rst round. ¤
An important implication of Corollary 1 is that there are at most two val-
ues (out of n possible values) of q such that the game cannot be classi…ed as
dominance-solvable or not. So, in this sense, non-classi…cation of the game be-
comes “unlikely”, but not impossible21, as the number of voters increases. If we
hold the distribution of preferences across voters constant as n increases, we can
prove a sharper result, namely we can provide necessary and su¢cient conditions
for games with more than a critical number of voters to be DS.
This can be formalized as follows, and this formalization also applies to the
general case. Let ¡n = (ui; X)i2N be the plurality voting game with a …xed number
n ¸ 3 players: Note that in any such game, there are K! possible strict preference
orderings over the K alternatives. Let Ánl , l = 1; ::K! be the fractions of players in
¡n who have the lth possible preference ordering. So a distribution of preferences
on X across players is characterized by Án = fÁnl gK!l=1: De…ne the m¡replica game
¡n;m = (ui; X)nmi=1 , m = 1; 2:: to be a game with nm voters but with Á
nm = Án,
all m; i.e. where the di¤erent “types” of voters in ¡n are replicated by the factor
m: The key feature of the m¡replica game is that the distribution of preference
pro…les in the population of players does not change as n gets large.
Holding the preference distribution Án …xed, de…ne qn to be the largest fraction
of voters who agree on the worst alternative in X = fx; y; zg. We make the
following assumption about ¡n;
A2. qn 6= 23 :
This simply rules out the case where qn is on the boundary. Then, we have the
following result, which follows directly from Theorem 3 below.
21Inspection of the proof of Corollary 1 reveals that qn + 1=n < 2=3 unless n is even and has
a remainder when divided by three of less than 2.
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Proposition 3. Consider any game ¡n for which A2 holds. Then there is an m0
such that for all m > m0, ¡n;m is dominance-solvable i¤ qn > 23 .
In other words, if the replicated electorate is large enough, and condition A2 holds,
then the game can always be classi…ed as DS or not DS.
Finally, the question arises as to how “likely” the su¢cient conditions for
dominance-solvability in Proposition 2 are to hold. A standard way of posing
this question is to suppose that the preferences of each member of the electorate
are determined by random draw from the K! possible preference pro…les, and
every possible preference pro…le is equally likely to be drawn . These are the
so-called “impartial culture” assumptions (Gehrlein(1988)). Under these assump-
tions, in the case of K = 3, it is easy to calculate that the su¢cient conditions for
dominance-solvability in Proposition 2 are satis…ed with probabilities that depend
on n as follows:
Table 1
# of voters 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 20 100
probability 0.333 0.136 0.273 0.136 0.059 0.123 0.059 0.003 0.000
As Table 1 indicates, the greater the size of the electorate, the less likely it is
that the condition is satis…ed. The intuition22 is that the probability that the
randomly chosen preferences of a voter rank any particular alternative (say z)
worst is 1/3, so the number of voters ranking z worst, nz; is binomially distributed
with probability of success 1/3. As n! 1, nz=n converges in probability to the
degenerate distribution with unit probability mass at nz=n =1/3. However, note
that there is no real reason to suppose that preferences are randomly generated
like this; rather, it is plausible that the common social factors that determine
preferences will imply that preferences are correlated, positively or negatively
22The values in the Table are calculated as follows. If n is not a multiple of 3, the value in
the Table is 3 times Pr(y > 2=3), where y~b(n; 1=3): If n is a multiple of 3, we add to this term
Pr(y = 2=3):(1 ¡ ¡13¢n=3), where the second term is the probability that preferences over (say)
z are non-polarized, given that exactly 2=3 of the voters rank z worst.
18
(Sen(1976), p 165). Either kind of correlation would tend to raise nz=n; making
dominance solvability more likely, and so the probabilities in the above Table may
better be interpreted as lower bounds.
Finally it is worth noting that the su¢cient condition for dominance solvability,
q > 2=3; in Theorem 1 is logically unrelated to Sen’s (1976) concept of value
restriction (which guarantees existence of a Condorcet winner), even though it
appears to bear a close resemblance. Our condition is weaker in the sense that
it requires less than full agreement across voters, but stronger in that agreement
has to be over the worst-ranked alternative.
4.3. Dominance-Solvability and Condorcet Winners
We now turn to a characterisation of the solution outcome in the event that the
game is dominance-solvable, and in particular how this outcome relates to the CW,
whenever the latter exists. The benchmark here is “pairwise” majority voting i.e.
majority voting with a binary agenda23. De…ne the majority voting game to be
the multi-stage game where at each stage, a set N of voters vote for either one
of a pair of subsets of alternatives, as speci…ed by a binary agenda. It is well-
known that if voters do not use weakly dominated strategies, the majority voting
game has a unique subgame-perfect equilibrium24, but the equilibrium outcome
in general depends on the agenda. In fact, (i) the outcome is agenda-independent
if and only if there exists a CW in X, and (ii) in that case, the outcome is always
the CW itself:
With plurality rule, the relationship between dominance-solvability and Con-
dorcet Winners is much less sharp. First, there is the question of whether dominance-
solvability implies existence of a Condorcet Winner, or vice-versa. Consider …rst
the case of at least four voters. Here, from Proposition 2, the game is dominance-
23An agenda is binary if at each stage of the voting, a voter can vote for either of two subsets
of alternatives.
24If the number of voters is even, we require a tie-breaking rule to ensure uniqueness. An
obvious such rule is that if two (subsets of) alternatives get equal numbers of votes, each is
chosen with probability 0.5.
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solvable if q > qn i.e. q ¸ qn + 1=n: It is easy to check25 that qn + 1=n > 0:5:
So, if the game is dominance-solvable, there is a Condorect loser. Consequently,
as K = 3; by a well-known result (Gehrlein(1988)), there is a Condorcet winner.
On the other hand, it is clear that the reverse implication is not true. Consider
Example 3 in the second case when the game is not dominance-solvable. There is
in fact a Condorcet Winner in this case, namely x.
Finally, if n = 3; it is not even the case that dominance-solvability requires
the existence of a Condorcet winner, as the following example shows.
Example 4. Ordinal preferences over the three alternatives are as in the Con-
dorcet paradox i.e.
1 : x Â z Â y
2 : y Â x Â z
3 : z Â y Â x
Then obviously a CW does not exist. Also, suppose that all voters have DMA
preferences. Then, by Lemma 1, we can delete the bottom- and middle-ranked
alternatives from each player’s strategy set, so the game is DS, and the outcome
is L1 = L(fx; y; zg): ¤
We can summarise our discussion as follows:
Proposition 4. If n > 3; then if the game is dominance-solvable, a Condorcet
Winner exists but the reverse implication does not hold. If n = 3, neither impli-
cation holds.
We can now turn to the second question, that of whether the solution outcome
is a Condorcet winner in the event that the game is dominance-solvable. It is easy
to show that if our su¢cient conditions for dominance-solvability are satis…ed,
then this is the case:
25In the odd case, qn + 1=n > 0:5 if 0:5n > [n+13 ]: As [
n+1
3 ] <
n+1
3 + 1, it is su¢cient that
0:5n > n+13 + 1: This holds for n ¸ 9: Finally, in the cases n = 5; 7; qn + 1=n = 3=5; 4=7
respectively. The proof in the even case is similar.
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Proposition 5. Whenever the su¢cient conditions stated in Proposition 2 for
dominance-solvability hold, then (i) W1 contains at most two alternatives, (ii)
if n is odd, a unique CW xcw exists, and W1 = fxcwg; (iii) if n is even, at least
one Condorcet winner exists (i.e. Xcw 6= ;), and W1 ½ Xcw:
Proposition 5 follows directly from Theorem 1 below. However, what if the
game is dominance-solvable, but the su¢cient conditions for dominance-solvability
do not hold? This is a possibility, as Example 3 shows. In this case, at least with
three voters, it is possible that the solution outcome is not a Condorcet Winner,
as the following example shows.
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Example 5. Ordinal preferences over the three alternatives are as follows.
1 : x Â z Â y
2 : z Â x Â y
3 : y Â z Â x
The unique CW is z: Assume moreover that only voters 1 and 3 have DMA
preferences. Then, By Lemma 1, V 11 = fxg; V 13 = fyg: So as voter 2 has non-
DMA preferences, his unique best response to v¡2 = (x; y) is v2 = x. So the game
is DS, and W1 = fxg 6= fzg: ¤
However, the case of three voters is not well-behaved in that whether or not
the middle-ranked alternative is weakly dominated or not depends on cardinal
preferences over the alternatives (cf. Lemma 1). We conjecture, but have not
been able to prove, that with at least four voters, every solution outcome must
be a Condorcet winner. We certainly have an asymptotic result of this kind, i.e.
Corollary 2 below. This says that if the electorate is replicated su¢ciently often,
and if the game is dominance-solvable, the outcome is a Condorcet winner.
5. General Results
We now consider the case of an arbitrary number K ¸ 3 of alternatives. In this
Section, we assume throughout that n ¸ 4; as we have seen above, the game with
three voters has some special properties. For any Y ½ X, de…ne ¡ = (ui; Y )i2N to
be the plurality game de…ned in Section 1 above, with a …xed set of n players,
but a set Y ½ X of alternatives. The preferences of players are the restriction of
the preferences over the set X, to the subset Y: For any such game, let Q(Y ) be
the largest set of voters who agree on a worst alternative in Y , and de…ne
q(Y ) =
#Q(Y )
n
(5.1)
This fraction plays a crucial role in what follows. Denote the worst alternative
in Y for voters in Q(Y ) by b(Y ). Without loss of generality, we will restrict our
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attention to games where b(Y ) is a Condorcet loser, i.e. q(Y ) > 0:5, so Q(Y ) is
unique.
Let X ´ XK; and de…ne the following sets recursively;
Xl¡1 = Xl=fb(Xl)g; l = K; :::2 (5.2)
Each set is obtained from the previous one by deleting the alternative in the
previous set that is worst-ranked by the most players, and the initial set is just X.
These sets are uniquely de…ned for any sequence of games where for each game, at
least a simple majority agree on the worst alternative (there exists a Condorcet
loser). Note that #Xl = l. We now have our general su¢cient conditions for
dominance-solvability.
Theorem 1. Assume that for all l = 3; :::K; either (i) q(Xl) > l¡1l ; or (ii)
q(Xl) = l¡1l and preferences are not polarized over b(Xl) in game ¡ = (ui;Xl)i2N :
Then the game ¡ = (ui;X)i2N is dominance solvable. Moreover, the solution
outcome W1 is that alternative in X2 which is preferred to the other by a strict
majority of voters, or L(X2) if equal numbers of voters prefer each alternative in
X2: Also, whenever (i) or (ii) hold, then (a) if n is odd, a unique CW xcw exists,
and W1 = fxcwg; (b) if n is even, at least one Condorcet winner exists (i.e.
Xcw 6= ;), W1 ½ Xcw:
The conditions require that for the sequence of sets of alternatives (XK; XK¡1; ::X3),
there is su¢cient agreement amongst the voters about which alternative is worst.
Moreover, the solution outcome is generated by sincere voting over the set of the
two-element alternatives, X2; that remains when the alternatives ranked worst by
the most voters have been sequentially deleted.
Two further remarks are appropriate at this point. First, if the game is DS,
then the only iteratively undominated strategies involve voting for one of two
alternatives in X2. This is consistent with Duverger’s Law, which asserts that
“plurality rule tends to produce a two-party system” (Cox(1997)). Second, our
su¢cient conditions for DS are quite strong in that they imply the existence of
a Condorcet winner, but they have the attractive feature that any alternative in
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the solution outcome W1 is always a CW.
The su¢ciency conditions in Theorem 1 can be quickly and easily checked,
and the solution outcome computed, as the following example shows.
Example 6. Ordinal preferences for …ve voters over four alternatives in X are
given below. Note that W is the Condorcet winner.
1 : W Â Y Â X Â Z
2 : X ÂW Â Y Â Z
3 : W Â X Â Y Â Z
4 : X ÂW Â Y Â Z
5 : Z ÂW Â X Â Y
First, four voters agree that Z is worst in X, so q(X4) = 4=5. So, we can delete
Z from X to obtain X3 = fW;X; Y g: Again, four voters agree that Y is worst in
X3, so q(X3) = 4=5. To check that the conditions of the Theorem are satis…ed,
note that
q(X4) =
4
5
>
4 ¡ 1
4
=
3
4
; q(X3) =
4
5
>
3 ¡ 1
4
=
2
3
Finally, X2 = fW;Xg: As voters 1,3,5 prefer W to X, W1 = fWg: ¤
We now present su¢cient conditions for the game ¡(ui; X)i2N not to be DS,
and a characterization of U , the set of iteratively weakly undominated outcomes in
this case. Consider the sequence of sets (5.2) above, and the associated sequence
of fractions fq(Xl)gKl=3. Also, for any game with l alternatives, de…ne the critical
fractions:
qln =
8><>:
qn in (4.2), l = 3
1 ¡ 1n ¡ 1n
£n+3l¡8
l
¤
; l > 3; n odd
1 ¡ 1n
£
n+3l¡7
l
¤
; l > 3; n even
(5.3)
where [x] denotes the smallest integer larger than x: Note that qln < (l¡1)=l, and
limn!1 qln = (l ¡ 1)=l: Obviously, q3n in (5.3) is equal to qn in (4:2). Then we
have:
Theorem 2. If there exists an l 2 f3; 4; :::;Kg such that (i) q(Xk) > k¡1k ,
all k > l; (ii) q(Xl) < qln; or q(Xl) = qln +
1
n and preferences over b(Xl) are
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polarized, then the game ¡ =(ui;X)i2N is not DS. In this case, the set of iteratively
undominated outcomes is U = fW (v) jvi 2 Xl=big; where bi is voter i0s bottom-
ranked alternative in Xl.
Note from Theorem 2 that we are also able to characterise the set of iteratively
weakly undominated outcomes even if the game is not dominance-solvable.
Theorems 1 and 2 together provide conditions under which a game is clas-
si…able as dominance-solvable or not, and these conditions leave few games un-
classi…ed. Indeed, we can generalize Corollary 1 as follows. It can be shown
that any k 2 f3; 4; :::; Kg; there is at most one possible value of q(Xk); namely
qkn+1=n; for which qkn < q(Xk) <
k¡1
k : Consequently, from inspection of Theorems
1 and 2, there is at most two possible values of each q(Xl) for which the game
cannot always be classi…ed as DS or not, qkn + 1=n and
k¡1
k : That is to say, if
q(Xk) 6= qkn + 1=n; k¡1k ; k 2f3; 4; :::; Kg, then the game can always be classi…ed.
If we hold the distribution of preferences across voters constant as n increases,
we can prove a sharper result, namely we can provide necessary and su¢cient
conditions for games with more than a critical number of voters to be DS. Con-
sider the m¡replica game as de…ned in the previous Section. For any preference
distribution Á, and set of alternatives Y ½ X, de…ne q(Á; Y ) as in (5.1) to be the
largest fraction of voters who agree on the worst alternative in Y . Also, recall
the de…nition of the sequence of subsets of alternatives XK; XK¡1; :::X3 de…ned
above. We make the following assumption about ¡n;
A3. q(Án;Xl) 6= l¡1l , l = 3; ::K:
Then, we have the following result.
Theorem 3. Consider any game ¡n for which A3 holds. Then there is anm0 such
that for all m > m0, ¡n;m is dominance-solvable i¤ q(Án;Xl) > l¡1l ; l = 3; ::K.
In other words, if the replicated electorate is large enough, and condition A3 holds,
then the game can always be classi…ed as DS or not DS. An obvious corollary of
Theorems 1 and 3 is the following:
Corollary 2. Consider any game ¡n for which A2 holds. Then there is an m0
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such that if m > m0, and ¡n;m is dominance-solvable, at least one Condorect
winner exists (Xcw 6= ;) and any solution outcome is a Condorcet winner i.e.
W1 ½ Xcw:
This is the most general statement of the relationship between dominance-solvability
and Condorcet winners.
6. Extensions and Conclusions
6.1. Mixed Strategies
Following many studies of voting behaviour (e.g. Moulin(1983), Besley-Coate(1997)),
we have assumed pure voting strategies. To what extent do our results extend to
the case where voters can randomize? Note that both the su¢cient conditions for
dominance-solvability and non-dominance-solvability are derived by …nding con-
ditions under which we can or cannot …nd a pure strategy that dominates another.
Clearly, the su¢cient conditions for dominance-solvability are una¤ected by the
inclusion of mixed strategies, in the sense that they remain su¢cient even when
mixtures are allowed. Our su¢cient conditions for non-dominance-solvability im-
ply that the remaining strategies for player i are a unique best response to some
strategy pro…le for the other players v¡i that has not yet been deleted. Thus,
such strategies cannot be dominated by a mixed strategy either, and our su¢-
cient conditions remain su¢cient, even allowing for mixed strategies. The only
open question is whether we can use mixed strategies to classify games in our
“indeterminate” region of values of qln.
6.2. Indi¤erence
Our assumption A1 does not allow voters to be indi¤erent between alternatives.
So, with indi¤erence, A1 cannot hold, and so in general, the order of deletion of
dominated strategies matters. There are two alternatives here. One is to make
assumptions su¢cient to ensure that the Marx-Swinkels Transference of Decision
Maker Indi¤erence (TDI) condition is satis…ed. This condition says that whenever
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a voter is indi¤erent between two pro…les where only his strategy changes, then all
players are indi¤erent between these two pro…les. An assumption26 which implies
TDI in our model is that if some i 2 N is indi¤erent between two equi-probability
lotteries L(Y ); L(Z), Y; Z ½ X, then so are all j 2 N . With this assumption, all
voters are indi¤erent between the same subset of alternatives.
The second is to accept that the order matters, and focus on the outcome
with some “plausible” order of deletion. The order of iteration we used to prove
Theorems 2 and 3 is of some interest. Iterated deletion is applied to the game
¡ = (ui; X)i2N until the alternative ranked worst by the highest number of voters
(say b) and only that alternative, is deleted from all strategy sets, so the game is
reduced to ¡ = (ui;X=b)i2N , and so on. This procedure is known as the Coombs
social choice function (Moulin (1983), p24). If we want to apply this order of
deletion with indi¤erence, the problem is that z may not be uniquely de…ned.
But, given some tie-breaking rule, we may be able to proceed as before.
6.3. Justifying Iterated Deletion of Weakly Dominated Strategies
It is well-known that if the structure of the game and rationality of the players
are common knowledge, then players must play only those strategies that survive
iterated deletion of strictly dominated strategies. If in addition, the beliefs of each
player over the strategies that other players might play are common knowledge,
then players must only play strategies corresponding to some Nash equilibrium
(Brandenberger and Dekel(1989)).
A common knowledge justi…cation for iterated weak dominance27 has recently
been presented by Rajan(1998). His results are established in a Bayesian frame-
work where each player has a in…nite hierarchy of prior beliefs. The …rst element
26This assumption is satis…ed, for example, in a citizen-candidate voting game where voters
are of K · n types, and every voter has strict preferences over di¤erent types, satisfying A1, and
is indi¤erent between two candidates of a given type. Then any voter is only indi¤erent between
L(Y ); L(Z) if Z can be obtained from Y by deleting candidates of some type and replacing them
by others of the same type, in which case all voters are indi¤erent.
27See also Stahl(1993).
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of this hierarchy is a probability measure on the strategies that other players will
play; the second is a probability measure on the prior beliefs of other players over
strategies, and so on. Rajan’s result is that if it is common knowledge that agents
are “hierarchically Bayesian rational” then each agent plays a strategy that sur-
vives iterated weak dominance. Hierarchical Bayesian rationality requires that
player i believes that for each player j 6= i, the probability that j will play any
non-best response strategy is in…nitesimal relative to the probability that j plays
a best response strategy, given j0s own beliefs.
6.4. Conclusions
This paper has presented conditions su¢cient for a plurality voting game to be
dominance-solvable, and su¢cient for it not to be dominance-solvable. These
conditions can be stated in terms of only one statistic of the game, the largest
proportion of voters who agree on which alternative is worst in a sequence of
subsets of the original set of alternatives, where each subset is derived from the
previous one by deleting the alternative that most voters rank as worst in the
previous subset. When the number of voters is large, “almost all” games can be
classi…ed as either DS or not DS. If the game is DS, the outcome is usually but
not always the Condorcet Winner, whenever it exists.
Dominance solvability has attractive features: it imposes weak requirements
on player’s rationality and moreover in voting games it usually leads to the choice
of the CW whenever it exists. However, it is not the only approach to dealing
with the multiplicity of Nash equilibrium. De Sinopoli(1999) studies (trembling
hand) perfection and properness in the plurality voting game above. He shows
that with more than four voters, if an alternative is not a (weak) Condorcet loser,
there is a perfect Nash equilibrium where that alternative is an outcome. [With
an odd number of voters, and no indi¤erence, there is only one Condorcet loser].
Finally, a natural question that arises from this analysis is whether our ap-
proach to characterizing su¢cient conditions for dominance-solvability and non-
dominance-solvability remain the same for voting games de…ned with other scoring
rules, like Borda and Approval Voting. This is a topic for future work.
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A. Appendix.
Proof of Lemma 1. (i) The …rst two statements are well-known (Brams (1994)).
To prove the third, let the alternatives be X = fx; y; zg. W.l.o.g., let the prefer-
ences of some i 2 f1; 2; 3g be x Âi y Âi z. Note that the vote of i only a¤ects the
outcome if he faces a vote distribution in the set ~-¡i = f(1; 1; 0); (1; 0; 1); (0; 1; 1)g.
Then, i strictly prefers to play vi = x rather than vi = y against (1; 1; 0) and
(1; 0; 1), and i weakly prefers to play vi = x rather than vi = y against (0; 1; 1) i¤
his preferences are (weakly) DMA.
(ii) To prove the fourth statement, we proceed as follows. Suppose w.l.o.g.
that voter i0s preferences are : x1 Âi x2 Âi ::: Âi xj Âi xj+1::: Âi xK. So, it
is su¢cient to show that for any j < K; there exists some !j¡i 2 -¡i such that
vi = xj is a unique best response to !j¡i; for then, vi = xj cannot be weakly
dominated relative to V:
Let !j¡i = (!
j
1; !
j
2; :::; !
j
K) where !
j
l is the number of votes (excluding i
0s) for
alternative xl: If n is odd, construct !j¡i so that !
j
j = !
j
j+1 = (n ¡ 1)=2; !jl =
0; 8 l 6= j; j + 1. As n > 3; note that !jj ; !jj+1 > !jl + 1;8 l 6= j; j + 1. So, if i
plays xj against !j¡i, the outcome is xj ; if i plays xj+1 against !
j
¡i, the outcome
is xj+1, and …nally if i plays xl; l 6= j; j + 1 against !j¡i, the outcome is xj or
xj+1 with equal probability. As i strictly prefers the …rst outcome to the second
or third, xj is a unique best response to !
j
¡i, as claimed.
If n is even, construct !j¡i so that !
j
j = n=2 ¡ 1, !jj+1 = n=2; !jl = 0; 8 l 6=
j; j+1: As n > 3; note that !jj ; !
j
j+1 > !
j
l ; 8 l 6= j; j+1. So, if i plays xj against
!j¡i, the outcome is xj or xj+1 with equal probability. If i plays xj+1 or xl; l 6=
j; j +1 against !j¡i, the outcome is xj+1: As i strictly prefers the …rst outcome to
the second, xj is a unique best response to !j¡i, as claimed. ¤
Proof of Proposition 1. If n > 3; this follows from De Sinopoli (1999), Propo-
sition 8, and the fact that if an equilibrium is perfect, it is undominated. If
n = 3; then if x is not a strict Condorcet loser, it is not a weak Condorcet loser,
either, so at least two voters out of three will prefer it to some other alternative,
y: Moreover, these two voters prefer x to an equal-probability lottery over the
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three alternatives. So, the strategy pro…le where each voter votes for her most
preferred alternative in fx; yg is an undominated Nash equilibrium with outcome
x: ¤
Proof of Proposition 2. If n ¸ 4; the Proposition follows directly from The-
orems 1 and 2 below, setting K = 3: If n = 3, and q > 2=3, then q = 1, so
all voters agree that some alternative (say z) is worst. So, after one round of
deletion, all voters have deleted z from their strategy sets, and so the voting
game is reduced to one of (at most) two alternatives for each player, and so is
dominance solvable. If q = 2=3, let b = z: Then the only possible kind of prefer-
ence pro…le is one where two voters (say 1,2) rank z worst, and voter 3 ranks z
middle. W.l.o.g, suppose that y Â3 z Â3 x: Then at the …rst round of deletion,
V 11 ; V 12 ½ fx; yg; V 13 ½ fy; zg: We can now show that v3 = z is a weakly domi-
nated strategy relative to V 1¡3. Then, z will be deleted at the second round, and
the game will be reduced to one of (at most) two alternatives for each player, and
thus be dominance-solvable.
Note that -1¡3 = f!¡3(v¡3)
¯¯
v¡3 2 V 1¡3g ½ f(2; 0; 0); (1; 1; 0); (0; 2; 0)g: Note
that v3 = y is a weakly better response to each of these vote distributions than
v3 = z, and a strictly better response to (1; 1; 0): So, z is weakly dominated
relative to V 1; as required:
Finally, note that q3 = 0, but q > 0 by de…nition, so q · qn is an empty
condition when n = 3: ¤
Proof of Corollary 1. It su¢ces to show that there exists at most one possible
value of q in (qn; 2=3), namely qn + 1n . Let m =
£2n
3
¤ ¡ 1: Clearly, mn is the largest
fraction less than 2=3, as
£
2n
3
¤ ¸ 2n3 :
(i) First assume n odd. We now show that m = nqn + 1. For then, m=n
will be the only feasible value of q in (qn; 2=3] other than 2=3: Then we require£
2n
3
¤
= n+ 1 ¡ £n+13 ¤ : Now, n = 3k + r, where r 2 f0; 1; 2g: So;·
2n
3
¸
=
·
2k +
2r
3
¸
= 2k + r (A.1)
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Also,
n+ 1 ¡
·
n+ 1
3
¸
= 3k + r + 1 ¡
·
k +
r + 1
3
¸
(A.2)
= 3k + r + 1 ¡ k ¡ 1
= 2k + r
So, comparing (A.1) and (A.2), we have the desired result.
(ii) Assume n even. We now show that m · nqn + 1. Then we require £2n3 ¤ ·
n+ 2 ¡ £n+23 ¤ : But n = 3k + r; r 2 f0; 1; 2g; so
n+ 2 ¡
·
n+ 2
3
¸
= 3k + r + 2 ¡
·
k +
r + 2
3
¸
(A.3)
= 2k + r + 2 ¡ maxf1; rg
¸ 2k + r
Comparing (A.1) and (A.3), we have the desired result. So, if m=n is in the
interval (qn; 2=3), it is the only such fraction of n in that interval. ¤
Proof of Theorem 1. De…ne
~Vi=b(Y ) =
(
Y=b(Y ); i 2 Q(Y )
Y i =2 Q(Y )
and also ~V =b(Y ) = ( ~V1=b(Y ); :::; ~Vn=b(Y )): Let y = #Y: The following intermedi-
ate result is obvious but useful:
Lemma A0. In any game, ¡ = (ui; Y )i2N , if all players have the same strategy set
i.e. Vi = Vj 8i 6= j; and each player has at least two strategies, then any player’s
top ranked strategy in Y is a unique best response to at least one strategy pro…le
of the other players.
We can now state and prove three additional Lemmas.
Lemma A1. In the game ¡ = (ui; Y )i2N , if q(Y ) > y¡1y , then b(Y ) =2W (v) for
all v 2 ~V =b(Y ):
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Proof. Suppose to the contrary that b(Y ) 2 W (v) for some v 2 ~V =b(Y ): Then
b(Y ) must get at least as many votes as all other alternatives in Y . But b(Y )
can get at most n(1 ¡ q(Y )) votes, as q(Y ) players have deleted b(Y ) from their
strategy sets. So, the total number of votes cast is at most T = yn(1 ¡ q(Y )).
Now, if q(Y ) > y¡1y , yn(1 ¡ q(Y )) < n, so T < n; a contradiction since we do not
allow abstentions. ¤
Lemma A2. In the game ¡ = (ui; Y )i2N , if q(Y ) = y¡1y , and preferences are
non-polarized, then vi = b(Y ) is weakly dominated for i relative to ~V =b(Y ):
Proof. First we prove that if b(Y ) 2 W (v) for some v 2 ~V =b(Y ); then, all
alternatives must be in W (v): For suppose not; let x =2W (v). Then, as b(Y ) can
get at most n(1 ¡ q(Y )) votes, so all y ¡ 1 alternatives in W (v) get n(1 ¡ q(Y ))
votes. Thus, the total number of votes cast is at most T = (y ¡ 1)n(1 ¡ q(Y )) +
n(1 ¡ q(Y )) ¡ 1 where n(1 ¡ q(Y )) ¡ 1 is the most votes that x can get and not
be in the winset. Now, as q(Y ) = y¡1y , T = n¡ 1; a contradiction since we do not
allow abstentions.
As the game is non-polarized, b(Y ) is not ranked best in Y by some i =2 Q(Y ).
From the above, at any pro…le v¡i 2 ~V =b(Y ), there are two possibilities for this
voter i. Either when vi = b(Y ), b(Y ) =2W (v);in which case he does weakly better
by voting for his most preferred alternative. Or when vi = b(Y ), b(Y ) 2W (v); in
which case all alternatives have equal numbers of votes, in which case, he could
do strictly better by voting for his most preferred alternative. ¤
Lemma A3. If (i) q(Y ) > y¡1y ; or (ii) q(Y ) =
y¡1
y and the game ¡ = (ui; Y )i2N is
non-polarized, then this game can be reduced to the game ¡ = (ui; Y=b(Y ))i2N by
iteratively deleting weakly dominated strategies.
Proof (i) First, from Lemma 1, b(Y ) is weakly dominated relative to V = Y n for
all players in Q(Y ), and so can be deleted from their strategy sets to get ~V =b(Y ) =
( ~V1=b(Y ); :::; ~Vn=b(Y )):
(ii) If q(Y ) > y¡1y ; Lemma A1 implies that b(Y ) 62W (v); for any v 2 ~V =b(Y ):
Thus, from Lemma A0, vi = b(Y ) is weakly dominated by the top ranked strategy
in Y nb(Y ); for all players i 2 NnQ(Y ) relative to ~V =b(Y ), and so can be deleted.
(iii) Lemma A2 implies that b(Y ) is weakly dominated relative to ~V =b(Y ) for
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some i 2 NnQ(Y ). So, we can delete b(Y ) from the strategy set of i 2 N=Q(Y )
to give a set of strategy pro…les W . But then by the argument of Lemma A1,
b(Y ) =2 W (v); v 2 W , as it can get at most n(1 ¡ q(Y )) ¡ 1 votes. So, b(Y ) is
weakly dominated for all players relative to W and thus can be deleted from all
the remaining players’ strategy sets: ¤
We can now return to the proof of Theorem 1. Under (i) or (ii) in the Theorem,
by Lemma A3, ¡ = (ui; Xl)i2N can be reduced to ¡ = (ui; Xl¡1)i2N by iterated
deletion of weakly dominated strategies. So, iterating, ¡ = (ui; Xl)i2N can be
reduced to ¡ = (ui;X2)i2N where each player has only two strategies. In the
game ¡ = (ui;X2)i2N ; the only undominated strategy is to vote sincerely, and so
the game is dominance-solvable, with outcome as described in the Theorem.
To prove the last part, let X2 = fx; yg. First suppose that n is odd. Then
w.l.o.g, suppose x beats y in a majority vote, so W1 = fxg: Then, x must be a
CW: For suppose not. Then, x must be ranked worse than some w =2 X2 by a
majority of voters, and thus must be in X=X2, contrary to assumption.
Now suppose that n is even. Then, either the above argument applies (i.e.
W1 = fxg; where x is a CW), or equal numbers of voters prefer x to y and vice
versa, in which case W1 = fx; yg. Again, x; y must both be CWs: For suppose
not. Then, one or both of x; y must be ranked worse than some w =2 X2 by a
majority of voters, and thus must be in X=X2, contrary to assumption. ¤
Proof of Theorem 2. Let l be the …rst k 2 f3; 4; :::;Kg for which q(Xk) · qkn.
Then, by the proof of Theorem 1, the game ¡ = (ui; X)i2N can be reduced to
¡ = (ui; Xl)i2N by iterated deletion of weakly dominated strategies. Let bi be i0s
bottom-ranked alternative in Xl. Then, by Lemma 1, vi = bi is weakly dominated
in ¡ = (ui;Xl)i2N , so we can delete bi from player i0s strategy set to get
Ti = Xl=bi; i 2 N
We now show that no vi 2 Ti is weakly dominated relative to T¡i; this implies that
T = £iTi is a full reduction of V by weak dominance (Marx and Swinkels(1997),
De…nition 3) and hence by Corollary 1 of Marx and Swinkels, the set of iteratively
undominated outcomes is U = fW (v) jvi 2 Xl=bi; i 2 N g:
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W.l.o.g., let Xl = fx1; :::xlg, and let N(xm) = fi 2 N jbi = xmg, 1 · m · l:
So,
Ti = Xl=xm; i 2 N(xm) (A.4)
It now su¢ces to show that for every i 2 N , there exists v¡i 2 T¡i such that
it is a unique best response for i to vote for any alternative x 2 Ti. For then, no
alternative in Ti can be weakly dominated for i:
W.l.o.g, let i 2 N(xl), so Ti = fx1; x2:::xl¡1g, and assume that x1 Âi x2 Âi
:::xj Âi xj+1::: Âi xl¡1: Also, let !¡i = (!1; !2; ::!l), be a vote distribution
over Xl, where !j is the number of votes for alternative xj, and -¡i(T ) =
f!¡i(v¡i) jv¡i 2 T¡ig: So, we need to show that there exists !¡i 2 -¡i(T ) such
that it is a unique best response for i to vote for any alternative x1; :::xl¡1. Note
two properties of a vote distribution !¡i that must hold if it is to belong to -¡i(T ).
First, the total number of votes must add up to n¡ 1;
lX
k=1
!k = n¡ 1 (A.5)
Second, !k must be no greater than the number of voters (excluding i) who do
not rank xk worst in Xl i.e. for whom xk 2 Ti: Inspection of (A.4) implies that
this requires
!l ·
X
k 6=l
nk; !j ·
X
k 6=j
nk ¡ 1; j 6= l (A.6)
where nk = #N(xk).
Case I: n odd.
We know from the proof of Lemma 1 that vi = xj ; j < l, is a unique best
response in Ti to !¡i = (!1; !2; :::; !l) if
!j = !j+1 > !k + 1; k 6= j; j + 1 (A.7)
So, it su¢ces to show that we can …nd ~!¡i 2 -¡i(T ) where (A.5), (A.6),(A.7) are
satis…ed. We construct ~!¡i as follows. First, set !j = !j+1 = !; where:
! =
(
[n+13 ] if l = 3£
n+3l¡8
l
¤
if l > 3
(A.8)
37
where [x] is the smallest integer greater than or equal to x: Let t = (n¡1)¡2! be
the number of remaining votes28: Note that we can always write t = s(l¡2)+r; s ¸
0; 0 · r < l¡2; where s; r are integers. Now, distribute the remaining t votes over
the remaining l¡2 alternatives as evenly as possible. That is, if r = 0; s ¸ 0; give
every remaining alternative s votes; if r > 0 and give every remaining alternative
s votes and an additional vote to r of the l ¡ 2 remaining alternatives. Clearly,
~!¡i satis…es (A.5) by construction.
Also, ~!¡i satis…es (A.7). To see this, note …rst that the maximum number
of votes for any of the remaining alternatives !k; k 6= j; j + 1 is s if r = 0; and
s + 1 if r > 0: Also, s = (t ¡ r)=(l ¡ 2): But then, noting that if l = 2; r ´ 0;
(A.7) requires simply that
[
n+ 1
3
] >
t
l ¡ 2 + 1 if l = 3 (A.9)·
n+ 3l ¡ 8
l
¸
>
t¡ r
l ¡ 2 + 2 if l > 3; l ¡ 2 > r ¸ 1 (A.10)
Using the de…nition of t; the inequality (A.9) requires
[
n+ 1
3
] >
n¡ 1 ¡ 2[n+13 ]
l ¡ 2 + 1
which, using [x] ¸ x; certainly holds. Also, the inequality (A.10) requires·
n+ 3l ¡ 8
l
¸
>
n¡ 2 ¡ 2 £n+3l¡8l ¤
l ¡ 2 + 2
which, again, using [x] ¸ x; certainly holds for l > 2:
It remains to check that ~!¡i satis…es (A.6). From (A.7), a su¢cient condition
for (A.6) to be satis…ed is that
! · X
k 6=j
nk ¡ 1 (A.11)
28It is easy to show that t ¸ 0. For this, we require n ¡ 1 ¸ 2[n+3l¡8l ] = 6 + 2[n¡8l ]: Now
the right-hand side of this inequality is largest when l = 3, so we only need n ¸ 6 + 2 £n¡83 ¤ :
It can easily be checked that this holds for n ¸ 6; the case of n = 5 can be checked separately.
Similarly, when l = 3; we can show that n ¡ 1 ¸ 2[n+13 ] for n ¸ 9; the cases n = 5; 7; can be
checked separately.
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Now let nk · µn;8k: Note that as Plk=1 nk = n, nk · µn implies Pk 6=j nk ¸
(1 ¡ µ)n; for any j. Then (A.11) is certainly satis…ed if the following holds:
! · (1 ¡ µ)n¡ 1 (A.12)
Now let qln be the largest value of µ such that (A.12) holds. So, qln satis…es (A.12)
with equality, i.e. qln = 1 ¡ 1n ¡ !n : Substituting out ! from (A.8), we get the
expression (4.2) for l = 3; and the expression (5.3) for l > 3; for the case of n odd.
Case II: n even.
Here, the argument is the same, except we now choose ~!¡i 2 T¡i such that
(A.13) below, rather than (A.7) is satis…ed;
!j = !j+1 ¡ 1 > !k; k 6= j; j + 1 (A.13)
For then, if (A.13) holds, by Lemma 1, vi = xj; j < l, is a unique best response
by i to ~!¡i 2 T¡i. The required vote distribution ~!¡i is constructed as follows.
First, we set !j+1 = !; !j = ! ¡ 1; where
! =
(
[n+23 ] if l = 3£n+3l¡7
l
¤
if l > 3
(A.14)
Also, distribute the remaining t = n¡2! votes over the remaining l¡2 alternatives
as evenly as possible29, as before.
Clearly, ~!¡i satis…es (A.5) by construction. Also, ~!¡i satis…es (A.7). To see
this, note by the argument in the odd case, that the maximum number of votes
for any of the remaining alternatives !k; k 6= j; j + 1 is s if r = 0; and s + 1 if
r > 0; where s = (t ¡ r)=(l ¡ 2): But then, noting that if l = 2; r ´ 0; (A.7)
requires simply that
[
n+ 2
3
] ¡ 1 > t
l ¡ 2 if l = 3 (A.15)·
n+ 3l ¡ 7
l
¸
¡ 1 > t¡ r
l ¡ 2 + 1 if l > 3; l ¡ 2 > r ¸ 1 (A.16)
29It can be checked, as for the odd case that t ¸ 0; since this is true i¤ n ¡ 2 ¸ 2!; i.e.
n ¡ 2 ¸ 4 + 2[n¡73 ]: The RHS is maximised when l = 3, thus it is su¢cient to show that
n ¡ 2 ¸ 4 + 2[n¡73 ]: The latter holds for n ¸ 6; and the case n = 4 can be checked separately.
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where t = s(l ¡ 2) + r, as before. Using the de…nition of t; (A.15) requires
[
n+ 2
3
] ¡ 1 > n¡ 2[n+ 2
3
] + 1
which, using [x] ¸ x; certainly holds. Noting that the RHS of (A.16) is maximized
when r = 1; the inequality (A.16) requires;·
n+ 3l ¡ 7
l
¸
>
n¡ 2 £n+3l¡7l ¤
l ¡ 2 + 2
which, again using [x] ¸ x; certainly holds for l > 3: Finally, (A.6) is certainly
satis…ed by ~!¡i if
!j+1 ·
X
k 6=j
nk
which, from (A.14), reduces to
! · (1 ¡ µ)n (A.17)
where nk · µn; 8k: Now let qln be the largest value of µ such that (A.17) holds. So,
qln satis…es (A.17) with equality. Solving this expression for qln;and using (A.14),
we get the expression in (5.3) for the case of n even, and the expression in (4.2)
for n even and l = 3. ¤
Proof of Theorem 3 .(Su¢ciency). If q(Án; Xl) > l¡1l ; l = 3; ::K obviously
q(Ánm; Xl) > l¡1l ; l = 3; ::K; m ¸ 1; so ¡n;m is DS for all m ¸ 1 from Theorem 1.
(Necessity). Assume that n is odd. The proof for the even case is similar. If
it is not the case that q(Án; Xl) > l¡1l ; l = 3; ::K; then, by A3, then there is some
l 2 f3; ::Kg such that
q(Án; Xl) <
l ¡ 1
l
; q(Án; Xk) >
k ¡ 1
k
; k > l (A.18)
But then as qln < (l¡1)=l, and limn!1 qln = (l¡1)=l, there exists a m0 such that
q(Ánm; Xl) = q(Án; Xl) · qlnm; m ¸ m0 (A.19)
So, we conclude from (A.18), (A.19) that
q(Ánm; Xl) · qlnm; q(Ánm; Xk) ¸ k ¡ 1k ; k > l
for all m ¸ m0. So, by Theorem 2, ¡n;m is not DS for all m ¸ m0. ¤
40
